II. INTRODUCTION
Commercial hydraulic fracturing started almost seventy years ago. Likewise, the first commercial horizontal wells were drilled in the early 1980s by Elf Aquitaine. to combine horizontal drilling with Mitchell's hydraulic fracturing techniques, the power of horizontal drilling may not have been fully appreciated. 8 Without the combination of these two technologies, the "American energy revolution" may never have occurred. AND STORAGE 127, 128 (Donald N. Zillman et al. eds., 2014) . 3 See GREGORY ZUCKERMAN, THE FRACKERS: THE OUTRAGEOUS INSIDE STORY OF THE NEW BILLIONAIRES WILDCATTERS 33-39, 44-46, 77-81, 93-95, 103-11 (2013) . 4 See id. at 34-39. But the star of the show is another wildcatter, former landman Aubrey McClendon. 10 His company, Chesapeake, co-founded by Tom Ward, 11 may not have pioneered the technologies of modern hydraulic fracturing, 12 but its aggressive acquisition of shale plays across the United States set it apart from its competitors. 13 McClendon, with the help of investment banker and close friend Ralph Eads, [43:435 biggest thing to hit Ohio since the plow," 25 and it was "one of our biggest discoveries in US history." 26 As stories of signing bonuses and the promise of rich gas royalties spread through the local communities in Eastern Ohio, owning land was like owning a lottery ticket. 27 For some, fortunes were made over night. 28 For others, their land was not over the sweet spots of the shale plays. 29 And for others still, what appeared to be their easy path to prosperity was blocked, much to their surprise and chagrin, by title ambiguities. 30 It was at this point that Ohio's dormant mineral rights became litigious and the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act (the ODMA) was scrutinized for the first time. 31 In fact, to say that the ODMA was scrutinized may be an understatement, as local lawyers have commented: "The amount of litigation that has been generated involving Ohio's DMA during the past three years [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] has rarely been seen with regard to a single statute." 32 Such problems with ownership are not new to American law. 33 In America, unlike most countries, 34 the surface owner owns subsurface rights. 35 In some cases, especially in resource rich areas, surface owners will 25 Robert L. Smith, Some Think a Gas Boom Can Reignite Ohio's Manufacturing Economy, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 22, 2011, http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf /2011/11/some_think_a_gas_boom_can_reig.html. 26 GOLD, supra note 6, at 206. 27 Spencer Hunt, Eastern Ohio Swept by Drillers' Land Rush, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 20, 2010. 28 Steve Hargreaves, Gas Boom Mints Instant Millionaires, CNN MONEY, Nov. 2, 2010, http://money.cnn.com/2010/10/06/news/economy/penn_community/. 29 Ian Urbina, New Report by Agency Lowers Estimates of Natural Gas in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2012, at A16. 30 sell the mineral rights under their land to another, creating a split title. 36 When such mineral interests prove valueless, the mineral rights are abandoned, forgotten, and often unmentioned in successive land transactions. 37 In Ohio, many seemingly worthless mineral right interests were poorly recorded through title documents, and they were inherited without notice from one generation to the next. 38 As explained above, these neglected mineral rights may never have resulted in any consequence except for their newfound value created by the advent and popularization of hydraulic fracturing. 39 Under the common law, some property rights can be deemed abandoned if there is evidence of both non-use and an owner's intention to abandon the property. 40 However, corporeal interests, such as severed mineral interests, are rarely 41 terminated in this manner. 42 Typically, statutory authority bolsters this common law forfeiture. 43 In cases where the abandonment impedes the marketability of property, the normal legislative response is the enactment of a marketable title act. 44 A marketable title act operates to create legal certainty of transactions by erasing the ambiguity created by ancient claims to title and, thus, eliminating potential liability. GAS (2008) (information on the oil and gas booms and busts in Ohio). 39 Blackwill & O'Sullivan, supra note 9, at 102-04. 40 See Snyder v. Monroe Twp. Trs., 674 N.E.2d 741, 750 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) . 41 The exception is the California Supreme Court in Gerhard v. Stephens, 442 P.2d 693, 718 (Cal. 1968 ) (holding the lower court correctly found that the "plaintiffs abandoned their [oil and gas] interests"). [43:435 In some hydrocarbon-producing states, however, the governing marketable title act either excluded mineral rights from its application or inadequately dealt with the problems arising from dormant mineral interests. 46 As a result, many states adopted a dormant minerals act. 47 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law supported this legal evolution by drafting a Uniform Dormant Mineral Interest Act in 1986 to guide state drafters. 48 In general, a dormant minerals act provides a mechanism, similar to a marketable title act, to erase the ambiguity created by ancient claims, but it does so more aggressively. 49 In other words, ancient claims do not need to be so ancient to be quickly dismissed by the function of a dormant minerals act-if such claims pose a threat to the marketable title of natural resources.
In light of Ohio's history of title ambiguities concerning mineral interests, it would seem fortunate that Ohio enacted a marketable title act, 50 and within it, a dormant minerals act. 51 The ODMA attempts to ensure that, in the face of title ambiguities, ownership and possession of mineral rights can be efficiently established. 52 In this way, the ODMA is designed to determine title certainty through a quick and efficient administrative 46 For instance, after the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling in Heifner v. Bradford, 446 N.E.2d 440 (Ohio 1983) , it became obvious that the Ohio Marketable Title Act would not be an effective mechanism for clarifying or terminating title to ancient mineral claims. In part, this led to the 1989 version of the ODMA. 47 These states include California, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See An Ohio Dormant Mineral Act Testimony: Hearing on S.B. 223 and H.B. 521, 1988 Leg., 117th Sess. (Ohio 1988) process; this helps lessee-developers avoid liability arising from exploration and production, and it facilitates oil and gas development.
53
To be clear, the ODMA's forfeiture provision is to establish clear title, not to grant surface owners the power to capture mineral interest from those who have legitimate claims to them.
54
Clear title must be established in a manner that best protects private property.
55
As the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law explained:
A [DMA] statute that combines a number of different protections for the mineral owner, but that still enables termination of dormant mineral rights, is likely to be the most successful. Such a combination may also help ensure the constitutionality of the act from state to state. For these reasons, the draft statute developed by the committee consists of a workable combination of the most widely accepted approaches found in jurisdictions with existing dormant mineral legislation, together with prior notice protection for the mineral owner.
56
To achieve this end, the ODMA establishes an eight-step process that affords surface owners the opportunity to acquire title to previously severed mineral rights, while still providing the mineral interest owners the opportunity to preserve their property rights.
53
See ODMA Testimony, supra note 47. 54 See BK Builders, Ltd. v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 5th Dist. Stark No. 2013CA00210, 2014 See Comment, Enhancing the Marketability of Land: The Suit to Quiet Title, 68 YALE L.J. 1245 , 1249 -50 (1959 ("[A] finding of unmarketability . . . operates to destroy a title's value unless and until it can be cleared by some remedial device . . . . In sum, judicial adherence to the marketability standard is both an implicit admission that shortcomings in the law of land-transfer engender private injustice, and an explicit process which serves to accentuate and aggravate the law's inadequacies.").
56
UNIF. DORMANT MINERAL INTERESTS ACT prefatory note (1986) , available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/dormant%20mineral%20interests/udmia_final_86 .pdf (section regarding the Draft Statute).
57
See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.56(B) (West Supp. 2014) (statutory requirements for surface owners to acquire mineral interests held by another).
Supporters view this as a sound remedy to "the 'often-tangled history' of mineral titles," 58 while critics argue that it is worse than a public taking.
59
This latter group posits that the legislature cleared the path for taking property from one private individual by another private individual.
60
Unlike in an eminent domain situation, where the state takes private property for "public use," 61 here, a private actor takes private property for their own profit.
62
To its champions, the ODMA is necessary to "encourage the development of minerals," fix "defects in title," and "enhance the economy of areas of [Ohio] : the lessee-gas company, the surface owner, and the potential owner of the mineral interest that was severed from the surface in question.
77
For the lessee, the dispute is usually of less consequence.
78
The landmen 70 See discussion infra Parts IV.B-D. 71 See discussion infra Parts IV.B-D. 72 See generally discussion infra Part IV. 73 See discussion infra Part II. 74 See discussion infra Part III. 75 See discussion infra Part IV.
76
Although there is a strategy in Ohio, New York, and Pennsylvania in which "neighboring landowners . . . unit [e] Deals, 27:4 NEGOTIATION J. 419, 426 (2011) , for the sake of simplicity, this is the classic ODMA/shale gas scenario that has been adopted. For more on the strategy, see id.
will seek out those with rival claims to the mineral rights and attempt to negotiate lease agreements with each.
79
The gas companies are usually successful in doing this.
80
The rivaling lessor-owners are enticed by a portion of the full signing bonus, win or lose.
81
Then, an agreement is reached where the remainder of the signing bonus and the royalty payments are placed in an escrow account for whoever establishes clear title to the mineral interest.
82
The gas company will proceed with their exploration.
83
Of course complications can arise, but it is important to note that these title ambiguities and the ODMA litigations create less disruption to exploration and production than one might think.
In this classic scenario, the surface owner is unaware of the mineral reservation.
84
The landman and the surface owner come to an agreement. 85 The landman explains that the lessor will receive the signing bonus after the gas company establishes that the lessor has clear title to the oil and gas interests in question.
86
But instead of a signing bonus check, the surface owner receives a written notice of a title ambiguity that must be clarified prior to entering into the lease agreement. potentially own a vast fortune in oil and gas is a great surprise.
91
In these cases, the severed mineral rights were owned, deemed valueless, and then silently past to the next of kin.
92
Not surprisingly, the newly-informed potential mineral right owners are reluctant to give up their claim-and the accompanying signing bonuses and royalties-without a legal challenge. The first step is to ensure that the mineral interest is not coal.
97
Coal has been king in Ohio for many years, 98 and its lobby secured an exception for coal rights.
99
Likewise, if the owner of the minerals is the U.S. Government, the State of Ohio, or any accompanying political subdivision, the ODMA will not apply.
100
Thus, the second step is to ensure that the subsurface owner is not the government.
101
In the third step, the surface owner will have to find a gap of twenty years between "savings events" related to the mineral interest in question.
102
If this dormant period between savings events exists, the surface owner will be able to establish a stronger legal claim to the mineral interest than the 91 See UNIF. DORMANT MINERAL INTEREST ACT (1986) If a gap of dormancy is established, the surface owner proceeds to the fourth step.
111
The surface owner must serve notice of intent to declare the mineral interest at issue abandoned, and subsequently, to claim ownership of the mineral interest.
112
The notice must be sent by certified mail, 113 with return receipt requested, to the last known address of each "holder" of the mineral interest. the person's rights from, or has a common source with, the record holder" of the mineral rights.
115
The fifth step is closely associated with the Fourth Step. If notice is not possible (for instance, the certified mail notice is returned undelivered), then the surface owner must publish notice at least once in a newspaper of general circulation in each county in which the land is located.
116
Although this Article does not address this issue, the surface owner is likely required to meet a level of due diligence in attempting to track down the holder of the mineral interest.
117
Within sixty days of service or publication of the notice, the holder must file a claim to preserve the mineral interest with the county recorder's office.
118
This is the sixth step. If the holder has a legitimate claim and files the preservation order, the holder will maintain ownership and be shielded from the forfeiture process of the ODMA.
119
However, if the holder of the mineral interest does not file the preservation order within sixty days, 120 the seventh step then requires the surface owner to file a notice of failure to file the preservation order in the county recorder's office.
121
It must be filed within the thirty-to sixty-day window after the date the notice was served or published.
122
Finally, in the eighth step, the surface owner sends a "notice of failure" to the county recorder at least sixty days after the date notice was served or published.
123
A surface owner who can manage to successfully navigate all eight steps will have legally taken the property under the ODMA. 
117
The level of due diligence necessary to identify the heirs of the severed mineral interest holder is unclear. The issue will surely be litigated. That said, some guidance is available from the case law dealing with Ohio Civil Rule 4.4, which sets forth the rules for serving parties by publication. See, e.g., Sizemore v. Smith, 453 N.E.2d 632, 635 (Ohio 1983 In other words, judges can interpret, but they cannot step beyond interpreting law to amend it; they cannot make statutory law.
132
Only the legislature can do that.
133
The main point is that judges must attempt to give "significance and effect" to "every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act" 134 without reaching beyond it to create new, and unintended, law.
135
This is in accordance with a great deal of the academic literature on the topic of statutory interpretation.
136
For instance, Justice Easterbrook explained that some judges and academics confuse the nature of statutory interpretation, leading to an overreach in the presumed scope of judicial authority. 126 See, e.g., Wingate v. Hordge, 396 N.E.2d 770, 771-72 (Ohio 1979 supply meanings, and they should choose the meaning that best accords with wise and just government. . . . [This premise] confuses legal with literary interpretation. The ambulatory nature of statutes means that judges have less power, not more.
138
The power to interpret is not the power to make law; it is bound by a "duty of restraint."
139
The function of a judge when interpreting a statute is "as merely a translator of another 's command." 140 Even if the legislature makes a serious mess of drafting a piece of legislation, the courts cannot rewrite a statute under the guise of interpreting it.
141
The judicial branch simply does not have this authority.
142
As Justice Frankfurter explained:
[Courts] are under the constraints imposed by the judicial function in our democratic society. . . . [Their] function in construing a statute is to ascertain the meaning of words used by the legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power which our democracy has lodged in its elected legislature. The great judges have constantly admonished their brethren of the need for discipline in observing the limitations. A judge must not rewrite a statue, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. . . . Legislative words presumably have meaning and so we must try to find it.
143
That said, there is a gray area.
144
Occasionally, there are gaps and uncertainties that force judges to make choices. the object sought to be attained; the circumstances under which the statute was enacted; the legislative history; the common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the same or similar subjects; the consequences of a particular construction; [and] the administrative construction of the statute.
147
Sometimes, such as with the ODMA, judges may face unfortunate outcomes not intended by the legislature, which are the result of the best plain meaning interpretation of statutory language.
148
These consequences are unfortunate, and some may encourage greater judicial activism in these situations.
149
But there are limits to what Ohio courts can do.
150
Courts ought to respect the limits of their power, since protecting democratic control over law making, even when flawed, is more important than the inequities that result from poor drafting.
151
If legislation is seriously flawed and leads to serious inequities, then it will likely be declared unconstitutional.
152
Otherwise, faults with statutory construction, and the unfortunate outcomes that arise from them, are the legislature's problem to fix-not the courts'. 
148
Wachendorf, 78 N.E.2d at 374. 149 For a discussion of the extremes of the debate over the possibility of constrained or objective legal interpretation, see Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 409-11 (1989 A statute that combines a number of different protections for the mineral owner, but that still enables termination of dormant mineral Committee, Rep. Mark Wagner disclosed that the 2006 amendments intended to correct deficiencies in the 1989 version; these deficiencies included clarifying both the processes for abandoning a mineral interest and for reuniting the mineral severance with the surface ownership.
155
As a result, the 2006 version now provides the detailed eight-step process discussed above.
156
The most significant additions are the notice requirements of the fourth step (notice by registered mail) 157 and the fifth step (notice by local paper), 158 along with the sixth step (the opportunity of the mineral interest owner to file a claim to preserve the mineral interest) 159 -all which are to be completed prior to reuniting the mineral severance with the surface ownership.
160
These three steps provide significant additional safeguards against expropriation not explicitly granted by the language of the 1989 version.
161
To explain, a plain reading of the 1989 version's text appears to automatically grant the surface owner the severed mineral right if there is a twenty-year gap without a savings event.
162
In other words, a surface owner need only find a twenty-year gap; 163 this evidence-without moreestablishes that the mineral rights were abandoned 164 and automatically rights, is likely to be the most successful. Such a combination may also help ensure the constitutionality of the act from state to state. For these reasons, the draft statute developed by the committee consists of a workable combination of the most widely accepted approaches found in jurisdictions with existing dormant mineral legislation, together with prior notice protection for the mineral owner. ACT prefatory note (1986) [An action to quiet title] may be brought . . . by a person out of possession, having, or claiming to have, an interest in remainder or reversion in real property, against any person who claims to have an interest therein, adverse to him, for the purpose of determining the interests of the parties therein.
UNIF. DORMANT MINERAL INTERESTS

177
Bill Taylor is one of Ohio's preeminent oil and gas lawyers, an advocate against the automatic vesting interpretation, and one of the most significant members of the Natural Resources Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association when it drafted the 1989 version.
178
In an interview, he explained the draft version of the 1989 ODMA was submitted to the Board of Governors of the Ohio State Bar Association, and it passed through the Board of Governors without change.
179
He confirmed that in the bill of the 1989 ODMA that went to the General Assembly, there was language that made it clearly not self-executing.
180
He was surprised with the General Assembly's cut of this language because it reduced clarity as regards the mechanism of vesting.
181
There was no apparent reason for this cut.
182
He speculated that perhaps the bill was too long or that the need for a quiet title action was self-apparent and thus redundant. Mr. Taylor emphasized that the bill was devised to be merely a statutory possessory interest in oil and gas-that is all. After Heifner, in his estimation, it appeared clear that a possessory right would still need to be asserted.
184
For these reasons, Mr. Taylor concluded that the 1989 ODMA was clear enough on this issue.
185
In fact, after the 1989 version was published, Mr. Taylor, as a matter of practice, filed quiet titles for his clients in such cases because he was confident that it was a clear and necessary step to capitalize upon the possessory interest created by the 1989 ODMA. The problems only started when lawyers and clients started to file affidavits instead of quiet title actions because they were cheaper and less complicated.
188
This trend caused some lawyers and clients to quietly question whether an affidavit would suffice or if a quiet title action was required.
189
It was this issue that opened the door for the more radical question of whether an affidavit was needed at all. In other words, the question arose as to whether the 1989 version was self-executing. 190 This confusion helped to trigger the 2006 amendments. 191 Thus, it appears clear that the original drafters intended for the 1989 ODMA to require a quiet title action to execute the conveyance of mineral rights to the surface owner. 196 On the other hand, another interpretation of these events is that the General Assembly's action to remove the explicit language was a deliberate attempt to make the ODMA self-executing. 199 In other words, if the Ohio Supreme Court determines that the 1989 version requires a quiet title action to execute the conveyance of mineral rights to the surface owner, the holding will effectively block any application of the repealed version.
200
On the other hand, if the court determines the mineral rights vested automatically, the surface owner can still enjoy the less strenuous standards of the 1989 version, provided that the owner can establish ownership of the property interest prior to the repeal. and is unequivocally silent to any further action, it appears the most accurate and plausible interpretation is that the 1989 version grants automatic vesting-regardless of the consequences.
206
The argument against automatic vesting asserts that the language "shall vest" implies the need for a quiet title action. It logically follows that the language "deemed abandoned" cannot create a right to automatic perfection, but merely provides an inchoate right-vesting of a right with the option for some affirmative action or judicial determination. In response, cases in different jurisdictions that go the other way are proffered.
213
These cases determined that the language "deemed abandoned" in their state's DMA creates a right to automatic vesting.
214
The champion case for bestowing a right to vest is Dahlgren v. Brown Farm Properties LLC.
215
In the trial court, Judge Richard Markus, an experienced judge of considerable influence in Ohio legal circles, held that the language of the 1989 version implied, at least, 216 an additional requirement of a recorded abandonment claim to provide mineral interest holders the ability to challenge the claim's validity. No. CA92-11-097, 1993 WL 414258 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 18, 1993 . 212 Plaintiffs' Response Brief, Dahlgren v. Brown Farm Prop., supra note 208, at 3 (citing Jacobs v. England, No. CA92-11-097, 1993 WL 414258 at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 18, 1993 Judge Markus went on to suggest that it might also require a judicial determination to confirm that claimed abandonment. Id. at *10.
217
Id. at *8. Judge Markus provided six reasons for determining that the 1989 version of the DMA did not provide for automatic vesting. Three of the reasons can be consolidated as an interpretation of legislative intent. Another justification was based on the general rule that the law does not favor forfeitures. Finally, another reason considered the constitutionality of automatic vesting, which is discussed elsewhere in this Article. Id. at *8-*9.
the position that even if the ODMA appears to unambiguously provide for automatic vesting, the interpretive process must extend further because the ODMA must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the legislative purpose of the Marketable Titles Act (MTA).
218
Judge Markus focused on the language of the MTA, which expressly provides that the MTA, including the ODMA, "shall be liberally construed to effect the legislative purpose of simplifying and facilitating land title transactions by allowing persons to rely on a record chain of title."
219
He concluded that automatic vesting conflicts with this legislative purpose.
220
To justify his conclusion, Judge Markus outlined how automatic vesting would play out in practice.
221
He explained that it would rob the title examiner of the ability to rely on the record chain of title 222 because it would demand that the title examiner be able to make an assessment as to whether one of the savings events had occurred within any given twenty-year period.
223
The record chain of title would no long provide conclusive evidence as to the owner of the property in question, and this could not be interpreted as "simplifying and facilitating land title transactions." 224 Rather, in his opinion, it appeared to be doing the opposite: making any determination of a clear chain of title more complicated and less certain. This may be debatable, but at bare minimum, no rational oil and gas company would commence a multi-million dollar hydraulic fracturing project without first ensuring that its lease is valid. In Walker and Swartz, since there was no saving event within the twenty-year look-back period from March 22, 1992 to March 22, 1972, these courts were able to avoid opening a Pandora's Box.
241
This was not the case in Eisenbarth, which presented a new interpretative challenge that threatened to dramatically increase the scope of the automatic vesting capacity of the 1989 version, 242 as will be explained in the next section.
243
C. The Look-Back Period Under The 1989 ODMA: Fixed or Rolling
Under the 2006 version, the language as to the twenty-year look-back period is clear and unambiguous. Section 5301.56(B)(3) states that the lookback period is " [w] ithin the 20 year period immediately preceding the date on which the notice is served or published." 244 This language indicates that the trigger event for the look-back period is the time in which the mineral owner either: (1) receives actual notice or (2) In comparison, the 1989 version imprecisely states that the look-back period is "within the preceding twenty years," with no clear indication as to what event triggers the look-back period.
247
This ambiguity has led to a number of interpretations.
248
The most obvious interpretation, at first blush, appears to be that "the preceding twenty years" is the preceding twenty years from when the 1989 version came in to effect (after the grace period): March 22, 1992. First, the rolling look-back period argument is considered "rolling" because the twenty-year look-back period rolls forward from March 22, 1992. This date takes into account the tree-year grace period. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.56(B)(2) (West 2005) (repealed 2006) ("A mineral interest shall not be deemed abandoned under division (B)(1) of this section because none of the circumstances described in that division apply until three years from the effective date of this section.").
was amended.
255
The potential number of occasions in which automatic vesting occurred from 1992 to 2006, makes this "rolling" interpretation of the look-back period particularly dramatic-especially when coupled with automatic vesting.
256
The drafters of the ODMA wanted to ensure the constitutionality of their drafting.
257
As a consequence, they did not make the legislation retroactive.
258
In other words, they intended for the look-back period to roll forward, not backward.
259
No one would seriously challenge this interpretation. Nothing in the language of the 1989 version challenges this, and the appellate courts in Walker, Swartz, and Eisenbarth support this position.
260
One rival to the proposition that the look-back period rolls forward is that it is a fixed 20-year look-back period from 1972 to 1992.
261
This rival interpretation, however, appears nonsensical without some justification for it, and there is no evidence in the history of Ohio's oil and gas industry or in 255 The dates in question would be from Telephone Interview with Bill Taylor, supra note 99.
258
The statute provides a two-year grace period for owners of mineral interests to record a notice of intent to preserve interests that would be immediately or within a short period affected by enactment of the statute. This procedure will assure that active or valuable mineral interests are protected, but will not place an undue burden on marketability. The combination of protections will help ensure the fairness, as well as the constitutionality, of the statute. adopt the fixed twenty-year period, but also the appellate court in Eisenbarth adopted the fixed period.
268
Rightly or wrongly, the majority in Eisenbarth appeared willing to let the ends justify the means. The majority clearly stated that they wanted to limit the application of the automatic vesting provision, declaring: "As forfeitures are abhorred by the law, we refuse to extend the look-back period from fixed to rolling." In fact, Bill Taylor states that, in the original draft of Natural Resources Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association, which was submitted to the Board of Governors of the Ohio State Bar Association, and passed through the Board of Governors without change, it made clear that it was a rolling look back period. See Telephone interview with Bill Taylor, supra note 99. In fact, he adds even without the language in the draft that made it through the legislative assembly, a fixed look back period makes little sense. Id. His speculates that the language was removed because it was probably assumed to be redundant. Id.
263
Id.
264
See generally SPENCER & CAMP, supra note 38 (a history of the upstream oil and gas industry in Ohio).
265
No. 94-CA-114, 1995 WL 498812 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 1995 . 266 No. 2012 -CV-020135, 2013 WL 839830 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Feb. 21, 2013 . Id.
270
Id. at ¶ 49.
271
"Land in many states is burdened by clouds on title and impediments to development arising from ancient grants of mineral, royalty or leaseholds interests . . . States faced with the problem caused by such ancient interests have sought in a variety of ways to remove these burdens." MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 35, § 215. In non-ownership jurisdictions, the doctrine of abandonment may apply to unify severed mineral and surface estates. The following states have adopted some type of Dormant Mineral Interest Act or its functional equivalent to deal with the problem of ancient mineral, royalty or leasehold interests: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, contemplated the function of DMAs more vigorously, the court might have discovered a possible justification for such forfeitures and framed the issue a bit differently.
272
But they did not do so. 273 Alternatively, the majority devised a scenario that satisfied their ends of not extending "the look-back period from fixed to rolling," 274 but failed to address why forfeitures in this context might be justified. They wrote:
In considering [the] question [of a fixed 20 year period], we ask: would a mineral rights owner be unreasonable in reading the statute on March 22 1989, the day of the enactment and saying: "I have a saving event in the past twenty years as I just bought these mineral rights in 1974; so I'm safe," without realizing that they had to reassert their interest by 1994 (5 years after enactment and 2 years after the grace period)?
We credit such thoughts as reasonable, and we concluded that the statute is ambiguous as to whether the look-back period is anything but fixed. The use of the words "preceding twenty years," without stating the preceding years of what, does not create a rolling look-back period. Rather, the imposition of successive look-back periods would have required language that the mineral interest is deemed abandoned and vested if no saving event occurred within twenty years after the last saving event.
275
Judge DeGenaro, in her concurring opinion, disagreed with the majority on this point, prudently writing that "the 1989 ODMA contemplated that the holder of severed mineral rights was required to renew that interest of record every 20 years. Thus, the [mineral holders] were required to make some kind of successive filing before the initial 20 year period expired." See Eisenbarth, 2014-Ohio-3792, 18 N.E.3d 477, at ¶ ¶ 48-54. 274 Id.
Id. at ¶ ¶ 42-54.
276
Id. at ¶ ¶ 65-68 (DeGenaro, J., concurring).
Judge DeGenaro is clearly correct. In support, Williams and Meyers, who offer the equivalent to a religious text for oil and gas law in the US, 277 define a Dormant Mineral Act as a state statute "to extinguish severed mineral and/or royalty interests" if "no exportation, development, operations or act of recording" has occurred "for a substantial number of years." 278 In Ohio, the "substantial number of years" mounts to twenty, 279 and the bare minimum "act of recording" is a claim to preserve mineral rights. 280 So, the 1989 version only required mineral interest owners to file a claim that they still want their mineral interests every twenty years.
281
The forfeiture is an incentive to ensure that mineral interest owners, at bare minimum, are not neglectful of their commercial interest in a property: use it or lose it. In other words, it is best to think of the application of the look-back period as a look-forward period for mineral interest owners-they are under an obligation to ensure that a savings event occurs once every twenty years.
285
This brings clarity to understanding the ODMA: the obligation to 277 LexisNexis describes this text as "the most authoritative and comprehensive treatise on the law relating to oil and gas." See LexisNexis Product Search Results, LEXISNEXIS STORE, http://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/home.page (search for "9780820521480"; then follow the "Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law" hyperlink). Id. at 7. 285 See id. record a mineral interest once every twenty years is to prevent ancient claims to mineral rights, which are long forgotten, from hampering the marketability of the interest in property today.
286
The owners do not even have to use the mineral interest commercially; they just have to acknowledge ownership every twenty years.
287
It is important to stress that this is not an exotic interpretation of a DMA. They all, for the most part, function in this manner. 288 Therefore, to assume that the 1989 ODMA would function contrary to this well-established norm for DMAs, without some clear and unambiguous language stating otherwise, is a misunderstanding of the widely accepted manner for extinguishing a mineral interest within a DMA. Since the Uniform Dormant Mineral Interest Act was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws in 1986, there has been great conformity toward this "recording Approach." The Uniform Act states:
A number of statutes have made nonuse of a mineral interest for a term of years, e.g., 20 years, the basis for termination of the mineral interest. Such a statute in effect makes nonuse for the prescribed period conclusive evidence of intent to abandon. The nonuse scheme has advantages and disadvantages. Its major attraction is that it enables extinguishment of dormant interests solely on the basis of nonuse; proof of intent to abandon is unnecessary. Its major drawbacks are that it requires resort to facts outside the record and it requires a judicial proceeding to determine the fact of nonuse. It also precludes long-term holding of mineral rights for such purposes as future development, future price increases that will make development feasible, or assurance by a conservation organization or subdivider that the mineral rights will not be exploited. The nonuse concept should be incorporated in any dormant mineral statute. Even a statute based exclusively on recording, such as the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act (USLTA) discussed below, does not terminate the right of a person who has an active legitimate mineral interest but who through inadvertence fails to record. ACT prefatory note (1986) , available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/dormant%20mineral%20interests/udmia_final_86 .pdf. The best answer is yes. Considering that the hypothetical mineral interest in question might be worth many millions of dollars, a reasonable person would hopefully consult a lawyer who would read the legislation and determine that it is reasonable to file a notice to preserve the owner's mineral rights given the potential risk.
UNIF. DORMANT MINERAL INTEREST
291
In light of this, the question can be framed a little differently: would it be reasonable to refuse to file a notice to preserve one's mineral rights, for a fee of $1,000-$2,500 every 20 years, 292 if the notice ensured the protection of one's property interest? If that property interest might be worth many millions of dollars in royalties over the life of the natural gas lease, 293 it is hard to imagine how this refusal can be construed as reasonable.
In reality, mineral interest holders involved in these litigations rarely knew the ODMA existed, and in 1989, before the advent of modern hydraulic fracturing of shale plays, did not appreciate the value of their mineral rights.
294
This is, admittedly, where the inequity of automatic vesting is rooted. For a critical assessment of rational choice theory, which after an extensive review of the literature upholds its merits, see Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 REV. , 1552 REV. (1997 .
292
This price range estimation for filing a claim to preserve a mineral interest in accordance with the ODMA was made by a local Oil and Gas Lawyer in Columbus Ohio. Interview with Anonymous, in Columbus, Ohio (Mar. 6, 2015) .
293
In Ohio, the average signing bonus on oil and gas leases was approximately $5000.00 per acre in 2012, and the average royalty nationwide was 18.7% in 2013. See Sally P. Schreiber, Before You Sign: Natural Gas Lease Tax Issues, J. ACCOUNTANCY (Oct. 31, 2013) , available at http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2013/nov/20138424.html. It is also estimated that 750 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable nature gas is within shale formations in the lower 48 U.S. states with the largest of these shale plays being the Marcellus. Id. These shale formations prior to the advent of Hydraulic Fracturing were deemed worthless by the upstream industry; ergo, the mineral interest in oil and gas were also worthless, so allowing the mineral interest to lay dormant was the natural result. It was of little difference to anyone whether the subsurface rights vested with the surface owner of not. There was no foreseeable justification for filing a claim to preserve one's claim to mineral interest in such shale plays. The "shale gale" changed all that, as Yergin writes: "The shale gale had not only taken almost the entire natural [gas] industry by surprise; it also sent people back to the geological maps." See id. at 334.
anticipated their mineral interests would one day have value, they would have possessed extraordinary foresight. 296 Thus, should such mineral interest owners be punished for not spending $1,000-$2,500 to preserve their seemingly worthless claim? A compassionate case can certainly be made that they should not. Nevertheless, as suggested of Judge Markus's efforts in Dahlgren, this Article appreciates the equity that the court in Eisenbarth is attempting to achieve, but it is occurring at the expense of the law.
297
It is worth repeating again, the consequences of the correct interpretation may be unfortunate, but there are limits to what courts can do to remedy problematic legislation through judicial interpretation.
298
In conclusion, the appellate courts achieved greater clarity as to the application periods of the 1989 and the 2006 ODMA, and there appears to be little reason for the Ohio Supreme Court to revisit the issue of automatic vesting. That said, this Article respectfully submits that the holding in Eisenbarth is problematic: the Supreme Court of Ohio ought to review this holding and consider whether the look-back under the 1989 ODMA is for a fixed or rolling period.
D. The Title Transaction Savings Event
Central to the 2006 ODMA is the operation of the six savings events, 299 which protect a holder of mineral interests from the forfeiture mechanism within the ODMA.
300
In general terms, the six savings events amount to a record of one of the following: a title transaction; To be shielded from forfeiture, 296 It was not until 1992 that, out of desperation to replace natural gas reserved, George Mitchell first attempted to use "massive fracks" to get gas from the source rock of the Barnett. ZUCKERMAN, supra note 3, at 38. It would be another eleven years before the natural gas industry truly believed that it could work. See YERGIN, supra note 15, Wingate v. Hordge, 396 N.E.2d 770, 772 (Ohio 1979 one of these has to have occurred once within the twenty-year look-back period.
307
This section addresses the most problematic of the six: the title transaction saving event.
308
This event is found in § 5301.56(B)(3)(a) and reads: "The mineral interest has been the subject of a title transaction that has been filed or recorded in the office of the county recorder of the county in which the lands are located."
309
When the bill for the 2006 ODMA was first introduced before the Ohio Senate, it specifically defined the scope of a "title transaction."
310
For a transaction to be a "title transaction," the mineral interest in question had to be "conveyed, leased, transferred, or mortgaged by an instrument filed or recorded in the recorder's office of the county in which the lands are located." 311 Unfortunately, from the standpoint of legal clarity, this language was removed.
312
Without a definition of a title transaction within the ODMA, an interpreter has to look to the more ambiguous, but seemingly more inclusive, definition provided by the Ohio's Marketable Titles Act (MTA).
313
This definition reads:
"Title transaction" means any transaction affecting title to any interest in land, including title by will or descent, titled by tax deed, or by trustee's, assignee's, guardian's, executor's, administrator's, or sheriff's deed, or decree of any court, as well as any warranty deed, quit claim deed, or mortgage.
314
The language "any transaction affecting title to any interest in land" speaks to the apparent breadth of permissible transactions that might 307 § 5301.56(B)(3).
308
One might be surprised that this Article is not addressing the issue that the Ohio Supreme Court will review in Dodd v. Croskey. This narrow issue focuses upon whether or not the requirement of 5301.56 (B)(3) applies to a claim under 5301.56 (H)(1)(a). There is nothing that this Article has to add to Judge Vukovich's excellent treatment of this issue, which supports the position that § 5301.56 (B)(3)'s requirements do not apply to a § 5301.56 (H) (1) First, the mineral interest in question must be "the subject" of the title transaction. 318 Second, from the definition of a title transaction, the transaction must "affect" title.
319
And third, the transaction must be at least recordable, since it also needs to be filed or recorded in the office of the county recorder.
320
What does being "the subject of" a title transaction mean? One interpretation is restrictive: if some right to the mineral interest is not transferred, then it does not satisfy the requirement suggested by the language, and is not a saving event.
321
Phrased differently, there needs to be some change in, or affect on, the mineral interest as a result of the transaction in order for it to be "the subject of" a title transaction.
322
Accordingly, the mere mention that there is a reservation of the mineral rights in the sale of the surface would not constitute a savings event, since the mineral interest in question is not affected by the transaction.
323
A broader interpretation of the language is that "subject" ought to be defined as "a person or thing that is being discussed, studied, or dealt with."
324
There can be many subjects of a book, a movie, a lawsuit, or even a title transaction. Thus, the phrase "the subject of" could be read quite broadly inviting a more expansive definition. As a consequence, this requirement does not demand the mineral interest be transferred in order for it to qualify as a saving event.
325 Therefore, the mention that there is a 315
Id.
316 See, e.g., Eisenbarth v. Reusser, 2014-Ohio-3792, 18 N.E.3d 477, ¶ 101 (7th Dist.) See Dodd v. Croskey, 7th Dist. Harrison No. 12 HA 6, 2013-Ohio-4257, ¶ 48 ("In order for the mineral interest to be the 'subject of' the title transaction the grantor must be conveying that interest or retaining that interest.").
322
See id. ("Here, the primary purpose of the title transaction is the sale of the surface rights.").
323
See id.
324
OXFORD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 1030 (2007 . 325 Reply Brief of Appellant, at 16, Walker v. Shondrick-Nau, No. 2014 -0803, Ohio (Dec. 22, 2014 [43:435 reservation of mineral rights in a sale ought to be enough to constitute a saving event because it is irrelevant whether or not the interest in question is affected by the transaction.
326
The latter interpretation is the weaker of the two. The rules of grammar, coupled with the Supreme Court of Ohio's presumptions regarding statutory language, compel acceptance of the narrower interpretation. The word "the," as a definite article, expresses specificity of reference to the noun it modifies, compared to "a," as an indefinite article, which expresses nonspecificity of reference.
327
Thus, if the section read "a" subject of the title transaction, "a" would indicate that the subject was indefinite; in other words, it could be one of several, nonspecific subjects of the title transaction. However, the statute uses the word "the":
The mineral interest has been the subject of a title transaction that has been filed or recorded in the office of the county recorder of the county in which the lands are located.
328
The use of the word "the" indicates that only if the specific subject of the title transaction was the mineral interest in question could the transaction qualify as a saving event. 329 Consequently, the definite article dictates that there needs to be some change in, or affect on, the mineral interest as a result of the transaction in order for it to be "the subject of" a title transaction.
330
What does "affecting title" mean? Affecting title can mean affecting the ownership in the freehold estate. See Dodd v. Croskey, 7th Dist. Harrison No. 12 HA 6, 2013-Ohio-4257, ¶ ¶ 47-49. 330 Id.
331
In the context of the ODMA, it is obvious to anyone familiar with property that the freehold estate is going to be a fee simple (basically ownership), and not a life estate or a fee tail. See JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL., PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 251-55 (9th ed., 2008) .
332
For instance, Morris Cohen provides a historical and critical realist critic of the history of property, which reveals the explicit nature of owning and the very political dimension encode within these legal notions. See Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1927) . For the sake of this analysis, a more straightforward understanding is appropriate. For instance, the nature of property in question can be gleaned which is described by Ohio's General Warranty Deed Form: title because it reduces the size of the freehold estate in Blackacre. 333 Alternatively, a quitclaim deed also affects title because the freehold estate changes from seller to buyer.
334
Another example is a mortgage, which, in Ohio, affects the defeasibility of the freehold estate until the mortgage is satisfied.
335
At the other end of the spectrum, does a contract, such as a license, affect title? Possibly, at least, it appears more certain that an oil and gas lease does. 336 Obviously, transactions that pass title to another qualify as affecting title, but beyond this, how ought one distinguish between transactions that affect title and those that do not? A workable option is to accept the proposition that it includes all transactions affecting the monetary value of title. This creates a clear test for identifying the remainder of transactions that would qualify-any transaction that creates an encumbrance on the mineral interest in question, including one that blocks the conveyance of that mineral right.
337
An encumbrance is a liability on, interest in, or a right to A deed . . . has the force and effect of a deed in fee simple to the grantee, the grantee's heirs, assigns, and successors, to the grantee's and the grantee's heirs', assigns', and successors' own use, with covenants on the part of the grantor with the grantee, the grantee's heirs, assigns, and successors, that, at the time of the delivery of that deed the grantor was lawfully seized in fee simple of the granted premises, that the granted premises were free from all encumbrances, that the grantor had good right to sell and convey the same to the grantee and the grantee's heirs, assigns, and successors, and that the grantor does warrant and will defend the same to the grantee and the grantee's heirs, assigns, and successors, forever, against the lawful claims and demands of all persons. 
334
A quitclaim deed is " [a] deed that conveys a grantor's complete interest or claim in certain real property but that neither warrants nor professes that the title is valid." Id.
335
In Ohio, a mortgage is a conveyance, which is made to secure repayment or performance. See Hurd v. Robinson, 11 Ohio St. 232, 234, 180 WL 43 (1860 Moreover, considering the purpose of the ODMA, it is reasonable to suggest that this may be the most appropriate approach to clarifying the "affecting title" ambiguity.
340
To explain, the forfeiture mechanism in the ODMA creates an incentive for the mineral interest owners to engage their property in some sort of commercial activity, or at bare minimum, generate evidence that they have not abandoned it.
341
If they neglect this obligation, then their mineral interests will be forfeited.
342
This helps ensure marketability in two ways: first, interest owners are forced to be mindful of their ownership of the mineral, and second, if they are not, it can be forfeited to those that appreciate its potential value.
343
In this way, it helps to save property, which has been forgotten by its owners, from being lost to the market forever.
344
If an owner cannot be found, the operation of the property, but it does not necessarily prevent a transfer of title. Encumbrances may be divided into two general classifications: 1. Liens (usually monetary charges) and 2. Encumbrances such as restrictions, easements, and encroachments that affect the conditions or use of the property. As a general principle, minerals are not deemed to be capable of being abandoned by a non-user unless they are actually possessed. Ohio is in the majority of jurisdictions which hold that a severed interest in undeveloped minerals does not constitute possession. Michigan's legislators recognized the importance of including minerals in those defects and errors which should be eliminated by operation of time and non-use. . . I believe that enactment of the Dormant Mineral Act will encourage the development of minerals in Ohio which have been previously ignored due to severance in title. Dormant mineral interests in general, and severed mineral interests in particular, may present difficulties if the owner of the ODMA's forfeiture mechanism will find one.
345
Since each of the saving events amount to evidence that mineral interest owners have not abandoned and forgotten their property, any transaction in the property that evidences commercial use ought to qualify. 346 Thus, interpreting "affecting title" to include transactions which create an encumbrance ought to be included as savings events.
In sum, the suggestion is that the language of § 5301.56(B), which reads "the mineral interest has been the subject of a title transaction," 347 ought to be interpreted to mean two things. First, that the mineral interest in question ought to be the central, essential, or fundamental subject of a transaction. Second, that the transaction in question is at least an encumbrance on that mineral interest. If these two requirements are satisfied, and if the transaction is recordable-the third requirement-then it ought to qualify as a saving event.
348
This appears to be the most sensible interpretation of the language.
interest is missing or unknown. Under the common law, a fee simple interest in land cannot be extinguished or abandoned by nonuse, and it is not necessary to rerecord or to maintain current property records in order to preserve an ownership interest in minerals. Thus, it is possible that the only document appearing in the public record may be the document initially creating the mineral interest. Subsequent mineral owners, such as the heirs of the original mineral owner, may be unconcerned about an apparently valueless mineral interest and may not even be aware of it; hence their interests may not appear of record.
Id.
345
See id. ("The greatest value of a dormant mineral interest to the mineral owner may be its effectual impairment of the surface estate, which may have hold-up value when a person seeks to assemble an unencumbered fee. Even if one owner of a dormant mineral interest is willing to relinquish the interest for a reasonable price, the surface owner may find it impossible to trace the ownership of other fractional shares in the old interest.").
346
For instance, consider the mechanisms "major attraction." The National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws writes: "[The nonuse scheme's] major attraction is that it enables extinguishment of dormant interests solely on the basis of nonuse; proof of intent to abandon is unnecessary." Id. But also consider the savings events in the ODMA. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.56(B)(3)(b). 347 § 5301.56(B)(3)(a).
348
The National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Law's hope that state would adopt a recording scheme to hopefully satisfy due process requirements at the state level; "A combination nonuse/recording scheme thus satisfies federal due process requirements. Whether such a scheme would satisfy the due process requirements of the In September 2013, the appellate court in Dodd v. Croskey was reviewing whether or not a mineral interest reservation, which was merely mentioned in a sale of the surface, would constitute a saving event. 349 The court determined that no germane case law, nor statute, determined what the language "subject to a title transaction" meant.
350
Entering this uncharted territory, the court relied on the rule of statutory interpretation as laid out in Smith v. Landfair, 351 which states: "first, the plain and ordinary meaning of language must be selected; and second, in determining this meaning, the language must be read in "accordance to the rules of grammar and common usage."
352
Upon application, the court concluded that a narrow interpretation of "subject" was appropriate, writing:
The common definition of the word "subject" is topic of interest, primary theme or basis for action. While the deed does mention the oil and gas reservation, the deed does not transfer those rights. In order for the mineral interest to be the "subject of" the title transaction the grantor must be conveying that interest or retaining that interest.
353
The court has set a prudent precedent here: for the mineral interest to be the "subject of" a title transaction, there needs to be some change in, or affect upon, the mineral interest as a result of the transaction.
354
A mere mention of the mineral interest will not suffice.
355
The Dodd ruling has been since followed by the district court in Buell, 356 which endorsed the court's reasoning as "sound," and also by the appellate court in Eisenbarth. Eisenbarth v. Reusser, 2014-Ohio-3792, 18 N.E.3d 477, at ¶ 27. Judge Vukovich, speaking for the majority in Eisenbarth, went further than merely endorsing Dodd; 358 he extended the application of the saving event analysis beyond the first requirement: the "subject of" requirement. 359 He first held that the mineral interest is the "subject of" the lease, and thus the lease passes the first requirement.
360
This leads to the second requirement: does a lease "affect title"? Since it is included in the list, the statute identifies that a mortgage affects title. 363 Judge Vukovich extrapolated that since a mortgage "does not transfer away title," other transactions do not necessarily have to "transfer away title" either. 364 Thus, the lease might meet the requirement.
Judge Vukovich then made a significant strive toward a farsighted rule, when he cites Karas v. Brogan 365 as authority. He wrote:
The Supreme Court has stated that an oil lease is an encumbrance [which affects] title… As such a lease is considered an encumbrance on a title, we conclude that it falls into the definition of "any transaction affecting title to any interest in land." It is important to note that Judge Vukovich draws a distinction between the transaction in Dodd, which involves surface rights, and the transaction at hand, which involves subsurface rights. Dodd, 2013-Ohio-4257, at ¶ 1. It is respectfully submitted that this distinction is redundant: the rule in Dodd necessitates that the transaction involve subsurface rights, since the transaction must result in some change in, or affect upon, the mineral interest, and the minerals interest in question, shale oil and gas, will always be subsurface. Id. at ¶ 32. Thus, overlooking this distinction adds clarity to the Eisenbarth precedent. See Eisenbarth v. Reusser, 2014-Ohio-3792 18 N.E.3d 477, ¶ ¶ 24-29 (7th Dist.) .
359
Eisenbarth at ¶ ¶ 24-29.
360
Id. at ¶ ¶ 24-35. 361 It is important to note that this Article interprets the language of § 5301.56(B) as having three requirements. That said, although Judge Vukovich does not draw distinctions between these three requirements, his reasoning tacitly does. Id. at ¶ ¶ 24-35. in their land.
376
The Ohio Coal Association did not oppose it, because it secured an exemption from the Natural Resources Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association, which drafted the bill (and most likely the Legislative Assembly). 377 Finally, the Ohio Oil and Gas Association endorsed the draft bill, because although some of its members might have lost mineral interests, it was overall very good for the upstream industry because it greatly increased business certainty.
378
With this kind of support, especially between mineral extractors and farmers, it appears all that the Legislative Assembly had to do was rubber stamp the bill when it got it from the Ohio State Bar Association. But they did not.
379
By the time it left the Legislative Assembly, it had been stripped of clarity, resulting in it becoming one of the most frequently litigated single statutes, over a three-year period, in the history of Ohio.
380
In retrospect, it appears that the Legislative Assembly made quite a mess of things.
The plain and obvious interpretation of the 1989 version is that if there was a twenty-year gap during the look-back period without a saving event, then the title to the mineral rights automatically reverted to the surface owner.
381
The effect is that, even today, surface owners can still turn to the 1989 version to see if they already own the property before turning to the more onerous eight-step process of the 2006 ODMA.
382
So, if the Ohio Supreme Court upholds the lower courts, as it should, then the 1989 version will offer an exception to the additional protections granted to severed mineral interest owners under the 2006 version. The lower courts have attempted to limit this loophole by deeming the look-back period to be for a fixed period from 1992 to 1972, but this is highly problematic. The Ohio Supreme Court should avoid following this mistake, even though supporting the rolling look back period will greatly extend the reach of this flawed legislation, further compromising the interests of some mineral rights owners.
The 1989 version may lead to unfortunate results, but the judiciary is bound by a "duty of restraint" to be "merely a translator of another's 376 Keller et al., supra note 1, at 4. 377 See Telephone interview with Bill Taylor, supra note 99. 378 See ODMA Testimony, supra note 47, at 3 (Mr. Taylor was member of the Legal Committee for the Ohio Oil and Gas Association, and provided testimony as proponent of the 1989 ODMA).
379
See Keller et al., supra note 1, at 21.
380
381
Id. at 4-5. 382 See supra note 57.
